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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
______________ 
 
No. 13-1200 
______________ 
 
MARK A. HORST 
           Appellant 
 
v. 
 
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY 
   Appellee 
______________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
(D.C. No. 5-12-cv-00099) 
District Judge: Hon. Edmund V. Ludwig 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
November 8, 2013 
______________ 
 
Before: GREENAWAY, JR., VANASKIE, and ROTH, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: January 8, 2014) 
______________ 
 
OPINION 
______________ 
 
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
 Mark A. Horst (“Horst” or “Appellant”) appeals the decision of the District Court 
affirming the Commissioner of Social Security’s (the “Commissioner’s”) determination 
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that he is not disabled, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 416(1) and 423.  For the following 
reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
I. BACKGROUND 
 As we write primarily for the benefit of the parties, we recite only the essential 
facts.   
In November 2006, Horst suffered an injury to his back while lifting a case of soda 
at work, causing back pain and leg numbness.  As a result, Horst consulted with several 
doctors in the ensuing years, based on both physical symptoms related to this injury and 
mental impairment arising from depression.
1
   
The Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) described Horst’s treatment 
comprehensively; we need not repeat it in toto here.  To summarize, beginning in 2007, 
Horst saw three principal doctors
2
 for his physical ailments:  Dr. Thomas Kohl, his 
treating physician; Dr. Stephen Banco, his orthopedic surgeon; and Dr. Yong Park, a pain 
management consultant. 
In August 2007, Dr. Banco performed a posterior spinal fusion and lumbar 
laminectomy, which, despite its success, left Horst continuing to complain of persistent 
pain and limited physical ability.  Dr. Banco referred him to an occupational therapist for 
a Functional Capacity Evaluation (“FCE”) in March 2008.  The FCE was inconclusive 
due to Horst’s “self-limiting” behavior.  (App. 692-93.) 
                                              
1
 Horst also submitted to the Administrative Law Judge information regarding 
alcohol addiction.  
 
2
 The record includes treatment notes from several other doctors, all of which we 
have considered in reaching our decision here.  
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In July 2008, Dr. Banco reviewed a surveillance video depicting Horst performing 
several physical tasks Horst had claimed he could not do, such as walking without his 
cane and lifting his son into a car seat.  As a result of seeing this video, Dr. Banco 
released Horst to full duty, stating he had a complete fusion and appeared to be 
exaggerating his symptoms.  
Dr. Kohl’s notes based on his examinations of Horst between the time of his 
surgery (August 2007) and January 2010 routinely reflect his view that Horst was “OK to 
resume activity; no heavy work/lifting” (App. 808, 809, 811, 813), “overall getting 
better” (App. 817), and that his leg pain had abated (App. 813).  Despite these 
observations, Dr. Kohl wrote a letter dated January 8, 2010 asserting that Horst was 
“unable to return to work” due to chronic back pain.  (App. 938.) 
Dr. Park administered epidural injections to treat Horst’s pain.  While these 
injections initially helped, Horst complained to Dr. Park that the pain would return a short 
time later.  
With respect to Horst’s mental health problems, he began seeing Martin Cheatle, 
Ph.D., director of the Reading Hospital Behavioral Medicine Center, in September 2007 
for psychological treatment.  Dr. Cheatle diagnosed Horst with depression.  Horst 
reported to Dr. Cheatle that he had previously attempted suicide, but denied further 
suicidal thoughts.  Horst was hospitalized for suicidal ideations in September 2008 and 
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was discharged following mood improvement resulting from medication.  Upon 
discharge, Horst had a GAF
3
 score of 55.  
In May 2009, Horst was hospitalized regarding his suicidal ideations.  He was 
evaluated with a GAF score of 20 upon admission, but when he was discharged five days 
later, his GAF score was 53.  In June 2009, Horst was evaluated by Dr. Daniel Sullman, 
who reported a GAF score of 20.  Horst presented for psychiatric treatment on August 10, 
2010, reporting depressed feelings but no suicidal thoughts; his GAF score was assessed 
at 55.  
Following his application for disability benefits, Horst had several residual 
functional capacity (“RFC”)4 assessments.  State consultants assessed Horst’s physical 
RFC to be limited to carrying 10 pounds frequently and 20 pounds occasionally and 
standing, walking, and sitting for 6 hours in an 8-hour workday, resulting in the 
                                              
3
 “GAF” stands for “Global Assessment of Functioning;” which  
 
is a numeric rating used by mental health practitioners to 
measure the functional impairment of a patient on a 0–100 
scale in accordance with the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders. A score of 40 represents 
“[s]ome impairment in reality testing or communication (e.g., 
speech is at times illogical, obscure, or irrelevant) OR major 
impairment in several areas, such as work or school, family 
relations, judgment, thinking, or mood (e.g., depressed man 
avoids friends, neglects family, and is unable to work . . .). 
 
Funk v. CIGNA Group Ins., 648 F.3d 182, 186 n.6 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Am. 
Psychiatric Assoc., Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 34 (4th ed., 
2000) (“DSM-IV”) (internal citations omitted)). 
 
4
 “‘Residual functional capacity’ is defined as that which an individual is still able 
to do despite the limitations caused by his or her impairment(s).”  Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 
F.3d 358, 359 n.1 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)). 
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conclusion that he could perform less than the full range of light work.  By contrast, Dr. 
Leon Venier, an independent consultative physician, examined Horst, finding his 
impairments to be far more severe, limiting him to carrying 2-3 pounds frequently and 10 
pounds occasionally, standing for 1 hour, and sitting for 2 hours in an 8-hour workday.  
Alex Siegel, Ph.D., a state agency consultant, completed a mental RFC assessment on 
Horst, concluding that he could understand and follow simple job instructions.   
Horst’s application was initially denied.  He requested a hearing, which was held 
on July 21, 2010 where he testified that he was unable to work due to the combined 
effects of his physical and mental impairments.  He further testified that he could perform 
numerous tasks of daily living, such as sweeping, taking out the trash, driving, and 
regularly socializing in person and on the phone.  
In a thorough opinion, the ALJ determined that Horst’s symptoms did not meet or  
equal any of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, App. 1, and that 
Horst had the RFC to perform less than a full range of light work.  In reaching this 
conclusion, the ALJ noted that Horst’s testimony reflected a level of functioning 
“inconsistent with his allegations of complete disability.”  (App. 39.)  She credited the 
state agency RFC assessment and Dr. Banco’s opinion that Horst was exaggerating his 
symptoms.  She also rejected Dr. Venier’s RFC assessment and Dr. Kohl’s letter, 
determining both were conclusory and inconsistent with the record evidence.  The 
Appeals Council denied review and Horst brought suit in the District Court seeking 
judicial review.  The District Court denied his application for review, and Horst now 
appeals. 
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II. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).  We have 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
 Although our review of the District Court’s order is plenary, our review of the 
ALJ’s decision to deny benefits is limited to determining whether the ALJ’s findings are 
supported by substantial evidence.  See Hagans v. Comm’r of Social Sec., 694 F.3d 287, 
292 (3d Cir. 2012).  Substantial evidence is “‘more than a mere scintilla’; it means ‘such 
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate’” to support a 
conclusion.  Id. (quoting Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 427 (3d Cir. 1999)). 
 In reviewing an ALJ’s determination for substantial evidence, “[c]ourts are not 
permitted to re-weigh the evidence or impose their own factual determinations.”  
Chandler v. Comm’r of Social Sec., 667 F.3d 356, 359 (3d Cir. 2011).  Nevertheless, “an 
explanation from the ALJ of the reason why probative evidence has been rejected is 
required so that a reviewing court can determine whether the reasons for rejection were 
improper.”  Cotter v. Harris, 642 F.2d 700, 706–07 (3d Cir. 1981); see also Diaz v. 
Comm’r of Social Sec., 577 F.3d 500, 506 (3d Cir. 2009) (remanding case to ALJ where 
the Court “[could] not ascertain whether the ALJ truly considered competing evidence, 
and whether [the] claimant’s conditions, individually and collectively, impacted her 
workplace performance.”). 
III. ANALYSIS 
 An individual qualifies as disabled under the Act “only if his physical or mental 
impairment or impairments are of such severity that he . . . cannot, considering his age, 
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education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work 
which exists in the national economy.”  42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A).  To determine whether 
a claimant is entitled to disability benefits, 
[t]he ALJ must review (1) the claimant’s current work activity; (2) the 
medical severity and duration of the claimant’s impairments; (3) whether 
the claimant’s impairments meet or equal the requirements of an 
impairment listed in the regulations; (4) whether the claimant has the 
residual functional capacity to return to past relevant work; and (5) if the 
claimant cannot return to past relevant work, whether he or she can “make 
an adjustment to other work” in the national economy. 
 
Smith v. Comm’r of Social Sec., 631 F.3d 632, 634 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting 20 C.F.R. 
§ 404.1520(a)(4)(i)-(v)).  
Appellant raises three objections
5
 on appeal: (1) the ALJ failed to give controlling 
weight to Dr. Kohl’s opinion that Horst was “unable to return to work;” (2) the ALJ erred 
in rejecting the RFC assessment performed by Dr. Venier; and (3) in evaluating 
Appellant’s mental impairments, the ALJ gave insufficient consideration to Horst’s low 
GAF scores on September 6, 2008, May 21, 2009, and June 8, 2009, reflecting episodes 
of decompensation.
6
 
                                              
5
 In a footnote, Appellant references a deposition of Brian Shiple, D.O. in which 
Dr. Shiple asserts Horst would not be able to work full time before “going back on some 
type of disability.”  (Appellant’s Br. 15 n.3.)  Rather than raising any argument regarding 
this opinion, Appellant simply notes that the ALJ gave Dr. Shiple’s opinion “little weight 
because it is conclusory and is not supported by evidence of record.”  (Id.)  To the extent 
this footnote was intended to be an objection to the ALJ’s treatment of Dr. Shiple’s 
opinion, we reject it since the ALJ provided an explanation for her decision to give this 
opinion little weight. 
 
6
 “Episodes of decompensation” are defined as “exacerbations or temporary 
increases in symptoms or signs accompanied by a loss of adaptive functioning, as 
manifested by difficulties in performing activities of daily living, maintaining social 
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A. Failing to Give Controlling Weight to the Opinion of Dr. Kohl 
 Appellant argues the ALJ erred by failing to give controlling weight to the opinion 
of  Dr. Kohl, Horst’s treating physician.7  “Under applicable regulations and the law of 
this Court, opinions of a claimant’s treating physician are entitled to substantial and at 
times even controlling weight.”  Fargnoli v. Massanari, 247 F.3d 34, 43 (3d Cir. 2001).  
Controlling weight is given when a treating physician’s opinion is “well supported by 
medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent 
with the other substantial evidence.”  20 CFR § 404.1527(d)(2).  “Although the ALJ may 
weigh the credibility of the evidence, he must give some indication of the evidence that 
he rejects and his reason(s) for discounting that evidence.”  Fargnoli, 247 F.3d at 43. 
Here, the ALJ explained she gave Dr. Kohl’s conclusory statement that Horst was 
unable to return to work little weight “because it is inconsistent with the evidence of 
record.”  (App. 40.)  For example, Dr. Banco, who treated Horst for over a year, 
“concluded that [Horst] was exaggerating his symptoms,” based upon a video showing 
Horst “had a greater ability to function than he had reported.”  (App. 39-40.)  Further, Dr. 
Park’s medical records indicate improvement in Horst’s condition over the course of 
time.  Even Dr. Kohl’s treatment notes indicated improvement over time.  “In light of 
                                                                                                                                                  
relationships, or maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace.” 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, 
subpt. P, part A, app. 1 § 12.00(C)(4). 
 
7
 As an initial matter, “[t]he ALJ—not treating or examining physicians or State 
agency consultants—must make the ultimate disability and RFC determinations.”   
Chandler v. Comm’r of Social Sec., 667 F.3d 356, 361 (3d Cir. 2011).  See also 20 C.F.R. 
§ 404.1527(d).  Thus, neither the ALJ nor this Court need rely upon Dr. Kohl’s 
conclusion that Horst is completely disabled. 
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such conflicting and internally contradictory evidence,” the ALJ properly declined to give 
controlling weight to Dr. Kohl’s letter as it was “conclusory and unsupported by the 
medical evidence.”  Jones v. Sullivan, 954 F.2d 125, 129 (3d Cir. 1991).  Accordingly, 
the ALJ’s decision not to give Dr. Kohl’s statement controlling weight was supported by 
substantial evidence. 
B. Dr. Venier’s RFC Assessment 
Appellant additionally argues that Dr. Venier’s RFC assessment is consistent with 
other evidence in the record, including Dr. Kohl’s letter, and therefore should have been 
afforded greater weight by the ALJ.     
The ALJ explained why she was rejecting Dr. Venier’s assessment as being 
inconsistent with the evidence in the record.  Further, as the District Court correctly 
observed, evidence contrary to Dr. Venier’s assessment is readily apparent in the ALJ’s 
opinion, including Appellant’s own testimony, Dr. Banco’s statements, Dr. Kohl’s 
treatment notes, the occupational therapist’s observations that Horst was self-limiting 
during the FCE, and the RFC assessment performed by the state agency consultants.  
Given the presence of such contrary evidence, the ALJ’s decision to reject Dr. 
Venier’s assessment is supported by substantial evidence. 
C. Appellant’s Mental RFC Assessment 
Appellant’s final objection is that the ALJ erred by inadequately considering 
Appellant’s GAF scores from three episodes of decompensation, two of which followed 
the mental RFC assessment prepared by Dr. Siegel.  Appellant claims that the ALJ should 
not have relied on Dr. Siegel’s assessment because several periods of decompensation 
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occurred following Dr. Siegel’s assessment.  Therefore, Appellant requests remand so 
that a new mental RFC assessment may be performed, taking into account the additional 
periods of decompensation.   
There is no indication that the ALJ rejected Appellant’s mental health providers’ 
assessments during the purported episodes of decompensation.  The ALJ specifically 
discussed all of the episodes Appellant highlights, and noted in her opinion that she had 
considered the clinicians’ subjective GAF scores.  Even considering these episodes, the 
ALJ’s conclusion that Horst did not experience repeated episodes of decompensation, as 
required by Listing 12.04, is supported by substantial evidence in the record.  Although 
Horst experienced three episodes of decompensation within one year, no evidence 
indicates these episodes lasted for at least two weeks, as required by the Listing.  To the 
contrary, the record reflects prompt improvement to the level of “moderate” following 
treatment for two of the incidents.
8
  See 20 C.F.R. §404.1520a(c)(1) (“[In evaluating 
mental impairments, the ALJ] will consider . . . how [the claimant’s] functioning may be 
affected by factors including . . . medication[] and other treatment.”).  
The ALJ considered the episodes of decompensation and low GAF scores 
Appellant cites.  We conclude that substantial evidence supports her decision that these 
episodes and scores, considered with Horst’s other mental impairments, fail to meet or 
equal Listing 12.04.   
IV. CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
                                              
8
 The record does not include any follow up information from the third incident. 
